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    Abstract 
 
 
This paper reviews and categorises the literature on micro-systemic risks and on 
optimal policies designed to mitigate these risks. Micro-systemic risks are risks to the 
financial system that occur when the interaction of a bank with other banks or with 
financial markets, can propagate an initially localised shock to the whole financial 
system and can prevent the latter from fulfilling its intermediation and distributional 
roles. The severe episodes of financial crises that have plagued economies -  
developed and emerging markets alike - have made more compelling, the need for 
policymakers such as central banks, to develop prudential tools as part of crisis 
prevention and crisis management policies. We review the success of these policies 
under different theoretical paradigms. The paper ends with a brief synopsis of 
financial accelerator models which stress on how imperfections in financial markets 
may magnify the swings and intensity of business cycles and have a more entrenched 
impact on the macroeconomy.    
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     SECTION  A:  FINANCIAL CRISIS  INITIATORS 
 
 
1. Introduction to Literature on Financial Fragility 
 
There is no “one-size fits all” definition of what constitutes financial instability. Many observers will 
view a financial system as being stable if it shows much resilience and ability to resist a crisis due to a 
shock to either one institution within the system or to the whole system, within which all institutions 
operate. The pitfall with this doctrine is that financial instability is merely viewed as an “egg from 
which crises are hatched” – what “resilience” and “ability to resist a shock” mean, are not carefully 
defined. Thus, this stripped-down version is primarily viewing financial instability from the vantage 
point of a financial crisis. From this perspective, any systemic event that causes economic loss of value 
that is strong enough to cause serious disruption to real economy, will be categorised as instability.  
 
Haldane, Hall, Saporta and Tanaka (2004) argue, such a definition ignores the other possible ways 
financial instability may manifest itself. They argue that three non trivial issues would be absent from 
such a narrow perspective: (1) the initiator of a crisis; (2) the propagator of the crisis and (3) the 
existence of financial frictions which magnify the amplitude and frequency of crises, in a way that 
systematically alters the dynamic path of the economy. Haldane et al (2004) propose a holistic version 
of financial instability that nests the notion of a crisis within these three issues. If  the essence of a 
financial system is to allocate resources efficiently across time, across states of nature and to ensure 
smooth and efficient financing of investment projects and efficient pricing of risk, then a financial 
system will be viewed as financially stable if it guarantees the fulfilment of these  functions, even in the 
presence of a shock. Financial fragility will thus be viewed as one in which one or more of these 
functions become dismantled, due to shocks to the system. Through interactions with financial 
frictions, these shocks alter the dynamics of a crisis and give well defined shape to its anatomy.  
 
This holistic version of financial fragility encompasses the analysis of systemic risks involving 
financial intermediaries or banks. There are two aspects of systemic risk that the literature identifies: 
microsystemic risks and macrosystemic risks.  The former can be defined as: “risks to the financial 
system that occur when the interaction of a bank with other banks or with financial markets, can 
propagate an initially localised shock  to the whole financial system, by subjecting the derived 
analytics of the crisis, as an endogenous part of the theory2”.  It is this particular form of systemic risk 
with which we are concerned in this paper. The difference between the different interacting units that 
make up the financial system is important and any macroeconomic variable is taken as given or fixed. 
Macrosystemic risks, on the other hand side, can be defined: “risks occurring when, through  the 
presence of financial frictions or imperfections, a financial system’s interaction with the 
macroeconomy, can magnify the frequency and intensity of crises and have a more entrenched impact 
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on key macro variables (e.g real business cycle)3”.  With macrosystemic risks, the difference between 
different financial intermediaries is immaterial. It is thus theoretically possible to consider financial 
intermediaries as a single unit. What matters is the impact that financial intermediation has on 
macroeconomic variables and how, the presence of financial frictions that give rise to intermediation, 
can affect macroeconomic variables4.  
 
 The need to mitigate systemic risks in a financial system, is one of the most important  reasons behind 
the enactment of prudential banking regulatory policies. Measures may be implemented either ex-ante, 
as part of systemic-risk prevention or ex-post, as part of systemic-risk management. While the former 
concerns the institution of rules or standards that makes the financial system more “crisis-proof”, the 
latter concerns the instigation of policy measures to stall a crisis once the symptoms of its occurrence 
start to appear5.  It is worthwhile mentioning, though, that policy measures designed to stall a systemic 
crisis, are not without pitfalls. While they may be benign in preventing the fully blown impact of a 
system-wide crisis on output and on financial intermediation, they may cost a lot in terms of taxpayers’ 
money and have an adverse impact on incentives of key stakeholders in the financial system.  
 
Thus, if the costs of preventing a system-wide crisis are higher than the costs that the banking crisis 
itself entails to output and intermediation, then it does not make sense to regulate or impose policy 
measures. To be able to assess this cost and benefit of policy mitigation in a systematic way, we need a 
framework that juxtaposes both issues in one setup and that assesses the net benefit of policy measures 
in a welfare-theoretic sense. Fortunately, microeconomic analysis is helpful at providing that insight 
and helps assess how successful different policy measures are at tackling system-wide risks and 
whether they help restore the first-best allocation of resources.  
 
Following the above definition for microsystemic risks, the paper is organised under two main section. 
The first section, Section A, deals with  financial crisis initiators.  Here, the literature for financial 
fragility for the one-bank case, is reviewed and various policies designed to mitigate bank runs, 
reviewed and contrasted. Because most models of systemic risk involving bank runs, almost always 
start with a technological or liquidity shock occurring at one bank, it is useful to have an overview of 
the implications of this literature for policy mitigation. The second section, Section B deals with 
propagators of a crisis. Here, we go beyond the confines of the one-bank scenario to include cases 
involving multiple banks or involving an interaction between banks and financial markets. In these 
models, there exist several avenues, through which a bank failure may spread to other banks. Banks are 
often connected through the existence of overlapping financial contracts such as the interbank market 
in deposits or loans. Sometimes, they can interact with financial markets as well. In the absence of 
market failures, the interbank market or the financial market will allocate resources efficiently. Cash-
                                                                                                                                            
2 This definition is based on my own personal interpretation and quoted from my presentation slides, in a seminar held at the 
Bank of England, September 2005 
3 See footnote 1 above. 
4 For a survey of the literature on macrosystemic risks, please see Haldane et al. (2004) 
5 While it is not the purpose of the paper to review the literature on banking regulation, see section ( . ) of the appendix for a brief 
overview.  
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strapped banks will always be able to get their way out of liquidity troubles. If markets failures exist 
though, liquidity provision by the interbank market or by financial markets in general, may be 
inadequate. The illiquidity problem at one bank may contagiously spread to other banks connected to it 
through financial contracts or the illiquidity problem may turn into an insolvency one. In both cases, 
the existence of market failures will warrant a case for central bank intervention as a way of mitigating 
these crises amplifications. It is the purpose of this paper to categorise the literature therein, unearth the 
market failures responsible for the crisis propagation and assess how  policy measures are successful in 
mitigating systemic-risk . The roadmap is represented in the following chart: 
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Chart 1:  Roadmap of  Microsystemic Risks Taxonomy  
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 2. Literature on  Financial Fragility and Coordination Failure 
2.1  Liquidity Insurance Provision  
Banks are special compared to other institutions in that they are “dealers in financial contracts” 
(Freixas & Rochet (1997)), which are non-marketable, compared to other financial securities such as 
bonds and shares : they act as intermediaries between firms that are cash-strapped and that need to 
borrow (issuers of financial securities) and investors, who have excess cash and who wish to part off 
with that excess liquidity temporarily (recipients of financial securities).  Thus, the nature of a bank’s 
activities means that it is linked to its stakeholders through contracts. The features that these 
contractual arrangements have for the bank’s balance sheet, are categorised as follows:  
 
• Maturity mismatch - assets (e.g loans) are illiquid and liabilities (e.g deposits) are liquid;  
• Liquidity-profitability mismatch - the more illiquid the assets, the higher the return on the 
asset;  
• High gearing and relatively low capitalisation - deposits being very high relative to equity;  
• Creditors (i.e. depositors) are actually the bank’s clients. 
 
These features distinguish a bank from a number of other institutions and expose it to an array of 
risks6.  Consumers deposit their endowments in the bank but face uncertainty about the timing of their 
consumption. The problem that banks face is to try to match the structural features described above 
with the uncertainty about the timing of consumption by depositors.   By offering demand deposit 
contracts, they can do that. Since the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on bank runs and liquidity 
provision, there has been a surge in the literature of bank runs and on panic transmission. Diamond-
Dybvig (1983) contributed significantly to our understanding of banking activities because it was the 
first paper to analyse bank failure from the intrinsic characteristics of a bank’s balance sheet, as 
detailed above.  
 
In this model, banks are seen as intermediaries, that accept deposits from households, pool these 
resources and invest them in technologies to which depositors individually do not have access to, and 
offer depositors a better combination of returns and liquidity services. The bank offers depositors 
demand deposit contracts that basically allow depositors to withdraw their deposits to meet any 
pressing liquidity needs. 
 
Coordination failure has been rationalised as potential explanation for the behaviour of depositors. In a 
setting with the existence of a storage technology, a long term asset that can be liquidated prematurely 
                                                 
6 These risks include: credit, market, liquidity and operational risks. A complete description of these risks is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Refer to Freixas and Rochet (1997), chapter 8, for more details. 
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and a sequential service constraint, each depositor of a given bank is concerned with what other 
depositors of the same bank are doing. Thus beliefs about each other’s actions become important in 
decision making. This belief generated mechanism has a strong self-fulfilling element, such that 
multiple equilibria results.  
 
The model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is as follows: There are three periods, time 0, 1, 2. In time 
0, depositors invest their endowments in the bank. The latter invests the endowment in a short term 
liquid technology and a long-term illiquid technology and offers a demand deposit contract that depicts 
the amount the depositor will receive, following withdrawal of deposit. The illiquid technology yields a 
non-stochastic return of R in period 2. If liquidated prematurely (i.e time 1), it yields a return of r (< 1), 
thus representing a cost involved in early liquidation. There is also a short term liquid technology 
which yields a return of 1 (for every unit of endowment invested therein). Depositors are assumed to 
face a liquidity shock in period 1, which is independently and identically distributed among depositors. 
With probability λ, they may be impatient (i.e wish to consume early) and probability 1-λ, they may be 
patient (i.e wish to consume late). The distribution of liquidity shocks is common knowledge, but the 
private realisation of the liquidity shock is private knowledge. 
 
To see the improvement in consumption allocation, it is important to make a contrast between the 
three:  in autarky, each individual is bound by his budget constraint and the absence of any markets 
whatsoever, means that he consumes less or equal to 1 if he is an impatient consumer and less or equal 
to R if he is a patient consumer. With a financial market allowing for the possibility of trading assets, a 
consumption stream of (1,R) would be possible. Thus if the individual is impatient, he will sell his 
holdings of the long asset and consume the proceedings. If he is patient, he use the amount invested in 
the short technology to buy assets, which he can hold until period 2. Given equilibrium price for the 
financial asset, it can be seen that the market allocation coincides with the uppermost allocation, 
namely (1,R). This represents a Pareto improvement over the autarky but has a setback. At period 0, 
each agent would prefer a consumption plan that trades some period 2 consumption for period 1 
consumption.  Thus, agents would like to receive some insurance against the risk of being impatient. 
The financial market cannot offer perfect insurance against the risk of being an impatient consumer. 
The rationale is that the set of markets being allowed for is incomplete. There is no market for 
contingent claims, on which the individual can trade liquidity for delivery in the interim period, 
contingent on  his type.  
 
Financial intermediaries can be seen to fulfil that liquidity insurance role, through demand deposit 
contracts. The crucial point is that, while individual depositors face the uncertainty in period 0 as 
regards their liquidity needs,  a bank does not face such uncertainty. By the Law of Large Numbers 
(LLN), these idiosyncratic liquidity shocks will be mutualised and the proportion of early (late) 
withdrawals that the bank will face is exactly equal to λ (1-λ respectively). Thus, if the bank follows a 
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fractional reserve system, it becomes clear that it will earmark a proportion of λ of deposits to the short 
asset and a proportion of 1-λ to the long asset. 
 
If the bank faces excess early withdrawals (i.e withdrawals that cannot be met by the short assets 
alone), it will be forced to liquidate the long asset in period 1 in order to provide for the liquidity needs 
of those who withdraw early. Patient depositors know that since the long asset is liquidated, they may 
get a lower amount than promised by the demand deposit contract. They may therefore all have an 
incentive to withdraw early, thereby prompting a run on the bank7.  
        
                Table 1:  Consumption Profiles under Different Institutional Regimes 
Institutional Regime Consumption in period 1 Consumption in period 2 
Autarky ≤ 1 ≤ R 
Financial Market with 
equilibrium price for financial 
asset traded 
= 1 = R 
(Diamond-Dybvig(1983) setup) 
Financial intermediary offering 
fixed demand deposit contract 
(Coefficient of relative risk 
aversion >1) 
> 1 < R 
Financial intermediary offering 
fixed demand deposit contract 
(Coefficient of relative risk 
aversion <1) 
< 1 > R 
Financial intermediary offering 
fixed demand deposit contract 
(Coefficient of relative risk 
aversion =1)* 
= 1 = R 
Note:  
The optimal consumption profile in the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) set-up (first best) matches that of the 
financial market, in the situation in which the coefficient of relative risk aversion for depositors is 
equal to 1. In all other cases, there is a deviation of the  financial market  from the first best allocation. 
 
2.2 Policy Implications in Models of Liquidity Provision 
Banks offering fixed demand deposit contracts achieve the optimal risk-sharing allocation. But such a 
contract is very much susceptible to runs by cohorts of depositors, for reasons that have to do with 
extraneous variables (or sunspots), not explained within the model.. In the case of runs, the allocation is 
inferior to autarky. This trade-off between efficiency and stability that is inherent in the Diamond and 
Dybvig setup, has prompted research into possible ways to achieve the optimal (first-best) solution, 
                                                 
7 Notice that the nature of a bank run arises from an interaction between four features of the model: (i) The existence of a storage 
technology; (ii) The possibility of liquidating the long asset; (iii) The existence of a sequential service constraint, as implicitly 
assumed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983); (iv) The existence of strategic complementarities in the decision-making of depositors.  
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whilst mitigating financial instability. Possible reform proposals have ranged from institutional reforms 
(as ex-ante measures) and specific governmental policy measures like deposit insurance (as ex-ante 
measure) or suspension-of-convertibility (as ex-post measure). 
 
Institutional reforms concern the re-designing of the features of a bank’s balance sheet, so that, it no 
longer faces the dangers of financial instability.  If, through demand deposit contracts, banks become 
fragile once they face large premature withdrawals, one important remedy would be to try to match the 
bank’s structural features to the statistical predictability of the time pattern of withdrawals. The concept 
of ‘narrow banking’ does exactly that. With narrow banks, the maturity structure of assets are perfectly 
matched with the maturity structure of deposit contracts. Thus, the amount that the bank earmarks to the 
short liquid asset ( e.g its reserves), is sufficient enough to meet payments to depositors, should they all 
decide to withdraw early.  This form of institutional arrangement can help to prevent bank runs, but it 
does not achieve the optimal risk-sharing allocation. As Wallace (1988, 1996) argues and quoted by 
Freixas and Rochet (1997), the solution to the optimisation problem for the narrow bank is even 
dominated  by that of autarky or that of a bank engaged in maturity transformation.   
 
Government regulatory response may take the form of deposit insurance schemes or suspension-of-
convertibility.  Deposit insurance basically concerns the scheme designed to protect the interests of 
depositors, in the face of bank runs. Depositors are too small and diverse to be able to monitor the 
performance of bank managers. Furthermore, they may face high monitoring costs. This means that, left 
on their own, there will be an incentive for depositors to free-ride on each other’s attempt to monitor. The 
resulting underestimation of monitoring, means that there must be some agency to look after depositors’ 
interests, in case of bank failures. There are still questions in the literature surrounding the design of the 
most appropriate deposit insurance scheme8. Suspension-of-Convertibility (SOC)9 concerns the formal 
prohibition of the bank to serve more than a certain threshold of proportion of early withdrawals. By 
preventing the long asset from being liquidated or traded, it guarantees that a certain amount is still 
available for payment in the final period.  
 
The effectiveness of deposit insurance and SOC depend crucially on whether there are aggregate risks 
(about the aggregate proportion of early withdrawals) or not in the setup.  In the absence of aggregate 
uncertainty, they achieve the same results: they both eliminate the possibility of having bank runs and 
help maintain the optimum outcome. With aggregate uncertainty, the equivalence between the two 
schemes break down. SOC still eliminates bank runs, but it is not efficient as a risk-sharing instrument. 
The reason is that, with uncertainty about the pattern of aggregate withdrawals, there may be either of the 
following two scenarios: if the proportion of early withdrawals is too high compared to the threshold for 
SOC, those withdrawing early will be rationed and get a smaller amount than has been promised. If it is 
                                                 
8  For instance,  how should the system be financed? how to mitigate the adverse impact of deposit insurance of depositors’ 
incentive to monitor? should the insurance scheme be partial or full? 
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too low, it means that those deciding to withdraw in period 2, are too numerous, and again, will receive 
less than has been promised. In other words, SOC does not allow for contingent allocation. Deposit 
insurance, on the other hand, makes allocations contingent on aggregate shocks. In the special case in 
which the deposit insurance scheme is publicly run and financed by an appropriate tax system, the 
government can vary the tax rate based on actual realisation of early withdrawals, and achieve the 
optimal risk-sharing allocation. The actual results are subsumed in Table 2: 
 
               Table 2: Policy Implications - Summary 
 
 Specific nature of reforms Eliminate bank runs? Achieves first-best
(risk-sharing) 
allocation? 
Institutional Reforms Narrow Banking Yes No 
Contractual Reforms ¾ Equity contracts? 
(Jacklin, 1987), 
(Jacklin-
Bhattacharya, 1988)
¾ Make contracts 
more flexible?  
(Peck-Shell, 2000) 
  
Policy Measures 
 
(No Aggregate Uncertainty)
   
Suspension-of-Convertibility 
(SOC) 
 Yes Yes 
Deposit Insurance  Yes Yes 
Policy Measures 
 
(Aggregate Uncertainty) 
   
Suspension-of-Convertibility 
(SOC) 
 Yes No 
Deposit Insurance  Yes Yes 
 
 
2.3 Robustness of Liquidity Insurance Models 
Thus, demand deposit contracts are seen to achieve optimal risk-sharing, but are also see to be unstable. 
The natural question that comes to mind is: why are deposit contracts then issued by banks?  Since  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the literature on bank runs has evolved and many different avenues have 
been explored in a way that literally helps to answer this question from different perspectives. Jacklin 
(1987), for instance, argued that equity contracts can sometimes do better than demand deposit contracts 
for certain specification of utility function.  In this model, consumers are equity holders rather than 
depositors in the bank. Whilst achieving the same (optimal) consumption allocation as a deposit contract, 
these equity contracts are not susceptible to bank runs. The rationale is that equity contracts are 
coalitionally incentive compatible (i.e immune to withdrawals by coalitions of individuals) while deposit 
contracts are only individually incentive compatible .  For more general specifications of utilities, deposit 
contracts dominate equity contracts, thereby unearthing the inverse relationship between efficiency and 
stability again.  Other papers have endeavoured to rationalise the case for actual contracts taking the form 
                                                                                                                                            
9 This is the equivalent of a standstills arrangement in international finance. 
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of demand deposit contracts with the possibility of withdrawals on demand, rather than some other form 
(See Calomiris and Kahn10 (1991) and Diamond and Rajan11 (2001)). 
 
A trend of the literature on bank runs has also considered the “ other view” of bank runs and have related 
the performance of the bank’s assets to the business cycle. These models allow the return on the long 
technology to be stochastic. This second view reflects empirical studies by Gorton (1988), Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991), which show that bank runs are not random events but intimately related to the business 
cycle.  These models have important policy implications that help add new dimension into our thinking as 
to how policymakers should effectively conduct policy.  
 
Allen and Gale12 (1998) confirm the findings of studies by Gorton et al, by showing that the business 
cycle plays an important role in triggering banking crises. In a model in which the long technology is 
subject to stochastic returns and cannot be liquidated early, they show that bank runs are optimal in that 
they help achieve first-best optimal risk-sharing! Banks achieve the optimal outcome through offering 
fixed deposit contracts, with bank runs providing the optimal contingencies that help achieve first best 
result. Thus, according to Allen and Gale (1998), it does not make sense for governments to regulate the 
banking industry! 
 
Another paper which relates banking performance to business cycles is the one by Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2000). One of the setbacks of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, is that there is nothing within 
the model to explain what exactly triggers bank runs and coordination failure problems. The collection 
action problem means that each depositor is better off withdrawing conditional on other depositors 
withdrawing, even though, collectively, they would be better off if they did not withdraw.  What drives 
these beliefs is not within the realm of the model and can be attributed to extraneous variables like 
sunspot phenomenon. Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (1998) attribute this indeterminacy to two 
elements: common knowledge of fundamentals  and higher order beliefs certainty. Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2000) are able to pin down unique equilibrium in models involving bank runs, using the global games 
approach. They find the endogenous probability of bank run occurrence and relate it to the demand 
deposit contract. By trading off benefits of risk-sharing vis-à-vis the probability of bank runs, they 
characterise the optimal contract and show that it does not achieve first best. By getting rid of the 
                                                 
10 In the model, there is aggregate uncertainty and moral hazard. The bank is a monopolist and depositors only withdraw in 
period 2.  Whenever banks act opportunistically, asset returns go down. By being given the possibility of withdrawing on 
demand, depositors who observe low asset returns can withdraw- thus, mitigating any attempt for the bank to act 
opportunistically. In the special case of banks having superior information about their own activities, there is an incentive for 
depositors to monitor. 
11 Diamond and Rajan (2001) have  arguments which are similar to Calomiris and Kahn (1991) but differ in that they pay more 
explicit attention to the nature of  a bank’s illiquidity.  Entrepreneurs have special skills in generating returns for investment 
projects. Thus, putting the project into different hands will reduce the returns of the investment. As such, these projects are 
viewed as illiquid. By developing relationship with these entrepreneurs, banks are able to learn these skills and may even use 
them to their own advantage. Deposit contracts prevent them from so-doing through a mechanism, similar to Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991). 
12 We consider this model more explicitly later.  
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indeterminacy inherent in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they argue that it is technically possible to 
compute the effectiveness of alternative policy measures. In other words, if the model is no longer silent 
about the probability  of bank runs, it becomes convenient to estimate how successful different policy 
measures will be to pre-empt these runs. 
 
Zhu (2001) develops a two-stage banking model, in the same spirit as Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) and, 
attempts to examine the welfare properties of policy mitigation. He finds that SOC is both ex-ante and 
ex-post inefficient in preventing bank runs because it cannot distinguish between those with true liquidity 
needs and those who are simply running on the bank. Thus, even if bank runs are prevented, it is likely 
that some agents facing true liquidity needs cannot withdraw their deposits, while those without true 
liquidity needs get their money back. Deposit insurance is ex-post efficient in preventing bank runs but 
ex-ante inefficient, due to moral hazard reasons. Because the deposit insurance authority cannot monitor 
bank’s decision, banks have an incentive to behave opportunistically. The paper suggests that replacing 
full-coverage deposit insurance by interest-cap deposit insurance13, can overcome the moral hazard 
problem and help the economy achieve socially optimal outcome. The imposition of capital requirements 
is an efficient way to prevent bank runs. As capital requirements increase, the market equilibrium 
converges to the socially optimum outcome.   
 
Another trend has included moral hazard in models of bank runs. Since the work of Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991), in a setup that includes moral hazard and aggregate uncertainty,  several papers have attempted to 
include moral hazard considerations in bank run models and explore the properties. Cooper and Ross 
(1998) attempt to examine the trade-off between risk sharing and moral hazard associated with the design 
of banking regulations.  They show how regulatory instruments (like deposit insurance and capital 
requirements) can be used to control bank runs in an environment in which banks can act 
opportunistically by making imprudent investments and depositors can monitor the bank. Their paper is a 
synergy of similar work in the literature, including Matutes and Vives (1996), Besanko and Kanatas 
(1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). The main policy implications of Cooper and Ross (1998) setup 
are, as follows:  in the Diamond and Dybvig setup (1983), publicly financed deposit insurance can be 
effective as protection against expectations-driven bank runs. But moral hazard considerations are 
ignored. Deposit insurance avoids bank runs but has a two-pronged impact on incentives: on one hand, 
depositors are not willing to monitor the banks’ performance and, on the other, bank managers are willing 
to act opportunistically in order to maximise the option value of the deposit insurance. By taking this 
moral hazard consideration into account, they characterise the trade-off that helps derive the optimal 
degree of deposit insurance. Complete deposit insurance  is not sufficient to support the first best 
outcome, because depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring. This outcome can 
nonetheless be reached through a combination of policies. Capital requirements, when coupled with 
                                                 
13 Zhu (2001) argues that two variants of deposit insurance can be considered to mitigate the adverse effect of moral hazard that 
results from full coverage deposit insurance:  a limited-coverage deposit insurance and coinsurance. The former protects the 
principal and interest of depositors up to a certain limit. The coinsurance system specifies that only a proportion of deposits 
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partial deposit insurance, can eliminate this incentive problem and help achieve the first best allocation 
again. 
 
  SECTION B: FINANCIAL CRISIS PROPAGATORS 
3.  Models with Multiple Financial Intermediaries 
3.1  Introduction to Section 
Several episodes of financial crises are characterised by financial contagion among banks. The term 
financial contagion is taken here to mean, in broad terms, the spread of a banking crisis from one bank 
to another. The spread of a financial crisis from one bank to another can be through several channels. 
Contagious bank failures can be the result of either informational spillovers or contractual 
arrangements that connect banks or  common exposure to some fundamental. 
 
 Informational externalities arise when depositors perceive the banks to be similarly affected, even 
though there may be no direct form of contracts that connect banks. Thus, depositors at one bank view 
the event taking place at another bank, and update their beliefs about their own bank, so that their bank 
shares the same fate as the first bank. 
 
Contractual arrangements may take the form of direct links such as interbank market in deposits or 
loans or may take less explicit direct form links (e.g through asset prices or through the 
settlement/payment system).  In the former case, banks engage in cross-holdings of interbank deposits 
as a way of insuring against regional liquidity shocks. When one region suffers a banking crisis, the 
other regions suffer a loss because their claims in the troubled region fall in value. If the spillover effect 
is strong enough, it can cause trouble to banks in adjacent regions. In the worst case scenario, the 
trouble may spread from bank to bank and, may indiscriminately, affect all banks in the economy. In 
the latter case, when there is excess demand for liquidity, banks liquidate their long assets and this 
drives asset prices down. This drop in prices cause some banks to go bankrupt and this leads to further 
sales and further price drops. Bankruptcy spreads through the market for long asset. If the magnitude of 
asset price fall is large, this may prompt a chain of multiple bank insolvencies. Even, if the initial shock 
is small, the spillover effects through banks, may be cumulative and strong enough to warrant multiple 
bank failures.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
(including interest) are protected. In the model, the interest-cap deposit insurance is the same as the limited-coverage deposit 
insurance scheme because agents are homogenous.  
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Common exposures take the form of two banks being similarly and symmetrically exposed to the same 
fundamental. Hence, a change in the fundamental value will affect both banks, thereby prompting some 
form of ex-post correlation in their underlying asset. 
 
The concept of financial contagion has important implications for public policy activities of central 
banks as part of their crisis prevention and crisis management activities. More importantly, the 
multiple-bank setting involves aspects that spread beyond the confines of individual banks and that 
enable us summarise the resulting implications for central bank policy as follows: 
 
• What is the nature of  the dividing line between microprudential and macroprudential policy 
measures ? 
• How effective are public policies at making the financial system more robust? 
• How should central banks design the network structure underpinning financial systems in a 
way that best makes the financial system resilient to shocks? 
 
The sources of market failures responsible for transmitting a risk contagiously from bank to bank lie 
directly in the mechanism connecting the banks. Whilst this mechanism is responsible for channelling 
liquidity from liquidity-abundant banks to liquidity-strapped banks, it is also the channel through which 
trouble spreads in times of difficulties. Thus, the market failures directly responsible for spreading 
contagious risks are the externalities (and different forms they assume) that various channels create at 
times of trouble.  It is important to note that, in this section, we will not be focusing on how market 
failures, per se, prevent the efficient workings of the various channels. This will be the focus of the 
next section. 
 
3.2  Models with Overlapping Network Connections or ‘Direct Links’ 
Allen and Gale (2000) study a multiple bank version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in which banks 
are connected by an overlapping network of interbank deposit claims. The economy consists of a 
number of regions. The number of early and late consumers (who are assumed to have complete 
information about their environment) in each region fluctuates randomly, but the demand for aggregate 
liquidity is fixed. This opens the way for inter-regional insurance as regions with liquidity surpluses 
provide liquidity to regions experiencing liquidity shortages.  The implication of constant aggregate 
demand for liquidity, is that regional liquidity shocks are negatively correlated across regions. While, 
in the interim period, some banks face excess demand for liquidity, others face excess supply of 
liquidity. In the subsequent period, the patterns for liquidity demands are reversed. One possible way of 
insuring against regional liquidity shocks is to engage in an ex-ante cross-holding of deposits through 
the interbank market. The interbank market is one way of implementing risk-sharing among banks. 
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 While cross-holding of deposits are useful for reallocating liquidity within the banking system, they 
cannot increase the total amount of liquidity. If the total demand from consumers is greater than the 
stock of the short asset, the only way to meet this excess demand, is to liquidate the long asset. Allen 
and Gale (2000) show that, based on cost considerations, banks prefer to liquidate the short asset first, 
then their holdings of deposits in other banks and, lastly, their long asset. With the presence of an 
unanticipated aggregate liquidity shock (this condition has been shown to be necessary and sufficient 
for the analysis of financial contagion in the model),  banks facing excess demand for liquidity, are 
forced to claim back their deposits held in other banks.  If the amount received is small, the bank will 
be forced to liquidate its long asset to meet excess demand for liquidity. If doing so means violating 
incentive compatibility constraint (which technically makes returns to second period withdrawals 
higher than returns to first period withdrawals), there is a run on that bank and it may be forced into 
bankruptcy. Such an event reduces the equilibrium value of claims on that bank. Thus, other banks that 
hold deposits in it, will suffer a fall in their asset value. They may suffer from the same fate if this fall 
in asset value (i.e the spillover effect) is large. 
 
Whether contagion occurs or not depends on the pattern of interconnectedness that shapes the interbank 
market structure. Allen and Gale (2000) assert the existence of three possible types of networks 
connecting banks: complete, incomplete or disconnected. A ‘complete’ network is one in which each 
bank holds claims on all other banks. An ‘incomplete’ interbank market is one in which banks hold 
deposits at banks in the adjacent region only.  A ‘disconnected’ structure is one in which there may be 
no direct links between banks.  
  
The incomplete interbank market is more susceptible to contagious effects than a complete interbank 
network.  A complete network would ensure that the spillover effects of bank failure in one region 
evenly spreads out to all banks in other regions. Thus, a given size of unpredictable aggregate liquidity 
shock, is distributed uniformly across all banks. The greater the number of banks, the more spread out 
the spillover effects will be, and the greater will be the ability of the banks to meet uncertain liquidity 
shocks, without prompting bank runs. An incomplete network achieves the opposite results. The 
spillover effect becomes larger as the crisis spreads from one bank to another. The larger the number of 
banks, the larger will be the spillover effects. Contagion will inevitably occur in this realm. If banks are 
disconnected, the spillover effect is thwarted and does not affect the value of claims in other banks. No 
contagion occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 17
3.2.1 Robustness of Financial Contagion Models with ‘Direct Links’ and Policy Implications 
 
Various attempts to test the robustness of the Allen and Gale (2000) model, with varying degrees of 
success. Dasgupta (2002) uses the global games approach to study a two-bank version of contagion. In 
his setup, banks invest in a long term technology that yields a stochastic return (i.e one that is 
dependent on some independently and identically distributed fundamental). Depositors are assumed to 
observe the idiosyncratic fundamental of their bank with some noise and the timing in terms of 
decision-making is assumed to be structured and dynamic: depositors at one bank make their decisions 
before depositors of the other. In addition, in period 1, the banks face a regional liquidity shock that is 
negatively correlated across banks. In the spirit of  Allen and Gale (2000), banks cross-hold a fraction 
of their deposits, in period 0, as a way of insuring against these regional shocks.  Thus, given the 
realisation of the regional liquidity shock, the bank facing high withdrawals will claim back its deposits 
from the bank facing low withdrawals. Thus, there is a spillover effect in that, the value of one bank’s 
deposits in the other bank depends on the financial performance of the other bank14. As in Allen and 
Gale (2000), this provides the mechanism that propagates a crisis from one bank to the other. 
 
Exposure through the interbank market means that, while the degree of regional insurance against 
liquidity shocks is higher, the possibility of having contagious flows is also higher. The intensity of 
contagion increases with the size of interbank connections, provided by the ex-ante cross holdings of 
deposits. Tables 3 and 4 highlight the main lines of  contrast between Dasgupta (2002) and Allen and 
Gale (2000) as well as Dasgupta (2002) and Goldtsein and Pauzner (2003). 
 
Table 3  –  Dasgupta (2002)  v/s  Allen and Gale (2000) 
(Both models assume several banks connected through the interbank market in deposits) 
Allen and Gale (2000) Dasgupta (2002) 
Banking panics occur due to Aggregate liquidity 
shocks (necessary and sufficient conditions for 
Contagion to occur) 
No Aggregate liquidity shocks required for 
Contagion. The only requirement is adverse 
information about asset returns 
Financial Contagion occurs with zero probability Financial Contagion occurs with positive 
probability (endogenously derived) 
Network architecture matters – Contagion is a 
function of the pattern of connectedness of banks 
in the interbank market.  
- Complete network :  No contagion 
Network architecture is irrelevant - Contagion 
occurs with positive probability, even with 
complete network structure in the interbank 
market 
                                                 
14 Dasgupta (2002) uses the concepts of ‘debtor bank’ and ‘creditor bank’ to refer more specifically to which bank experiences 
the regional shock first.  
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- Incomplete network: Contagion occurs 
 
Table 4  -  Dasgupta (2002)  vs Goldstein and Pauzner (2003) 
 
Goldstein and Pauzner (2003) Dasgupta (2002) 
One Bank Several Banks connected through the interbank 
market in deposits 
Optimal Contract for deposits: 
Characterised by trade-off between risk-sharing 
and positive probability of bank runs (contracts 
offering better insurance also increase likelihood 
of runs) 
Optimal Contract for Interbank deposits: 
Characterised by trade-off between insurance 
against liquidity shocks and positive probability 
of contagion 
Result: 
Optimal contract offers less than full risk-sharing  
because doing so would be too destabilising 
Result: 
Optimal interbank deposit contract offers less than 
perfect insurance against regional liquidity shocks 
 
Dasgupta (2002) model shows, that for contagion to exist as an equilibrium phenomenon, it is not 
necessary to have unanticipated liquidity shocks. This goes against the philosophy of Allen and Gale 
(2000). Furthermore, it shows that, with the interbank market providing ex-ante liquidity insurance 
against regional shocks, the structure of connections, spanned by the interbank market, does not matter. 
Even with complete markets, contagion may still occur as an equilibrium event.  
 
Nonetheless, it will be interesting to point out how the two models vary in terms of their implications 
for welfare and use of policy for mitigating contagious risks. As ex-ante measures, Allen and Gale 
(2000) suggest the reform of the network architecture connecting banks. Since the complete network is 
more robust at mitigating the spillover effect than the incomplete network, it is highly suggestive for 
policymakers to ensure that the structure of overlapping interbank claims is as complete as possible. By 
preventing contagion, the appropriate design of the network system guarantees that the first-best 
allocation is reached. A similar conclusion is reached by  Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000). In this 
model, the source of uncertainty is assumed to be ‘location shocks’ i.e ex-ante, depositors are unaware 
as to where they should consume. It is only in the interim period (i.e period 1) that they will know the 
nature of this location shock. Decisions to withdraw are made in period 2. The network connecting 
banks depends very much on the pattern of travel. There are two travel patterns in the setup: a ‘credit 
chain lending’ pattern and a ‘diversified lending’ pattern. The paper also investigates the robustness of 
the different types of travel patterns to the possibility of contagion. The diversified lending pattern is 
shown to be more robust and less susceptible to contagious effects than the credit chain pattern. With a 
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credit chain pattern, the credit risk is concentrated on a few banks only. Thus, while a few banks take 
the hit, the effect at individual bank level may be strong enough to warrant closure of next bank. With 
diversified structure, the credit risks are more evenly spread across banks. When the number of banks 
is large, it is completely diversified so that no contagion exists. 
 
In Allen and Gale (2000), the  standard one policy tools, that can restore first-best in the one bank case, 
will work. But the timing and implications of central bank intervention will depend crucially on the 
interbank market structure, as discussed above, connecting banks.  
 
Only in the special case of an incomplete network, will policy intervention be necessary. Because the 
origin of the  banking panic transmission is an initial liquidity shock at one bank, it follows that ex-post 
measures (such as suspension of convertibility ) at that  bank, will help. The main point is that what 
creates the channel for spreading a crisis across banks, is interbank balance sheet connection. As long 
as the crisis is prevented where it started, the links between banks will not be affected and the balance 
sheets of all banks will be preserved. Thus, these policy measures do not create an externality of their 
own, on other banks. All arguments regarding policy measures, in terms of efficiency, will all go 
through. Contagion will be prevented (since none of the banks’ claims are affected). 
 
The concept of Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) can also be enunciated. LOLR is typically carried out 
when there are informational asymmetries, such that a bank experiencing temporary liquidity problem, 
can become insolvent or when an illiquidity problem can spread from bank to bank, amplifying all 
along the way, until it becomes degenerate. Since the Allen and Gale (2000) framework deals 
overwhelmingly with assessing channels that connect banks constitute the main externalities during 
times of troubles, it is obvious that LOLR, in such models, should be viewed more from (2), rather than 
(1).  By providing emergency funding to banks facing illiquidity problems, LOLR ensures that there is 
no need for the bank to liquidate its long asset – which prevents the value of claims that other banks 
hold in it to fall. Thus the spillover effect is thwarted.  
 
It is important to note that agents in the Allen and Gale (2000) setup, have complete information about 
their operating environment. In real world though, the analysis of LOLR, is conducted in an 
environment in which the central bank has incomplete information about the  liquidity and solvency 
positions of banks. In this case,  it will be optimal for the central bank to intervene if doing so entails 
benefits (in terms of preventing multiple collapse) that outweigh the costs ( in terms of taxpayers’ 
money), so that, from a more generalised perspective, it is welfare improving, from society’s point, to 
do so.  
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Not many papers adopt the same perspective.  Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue that, in a multiple bank 
setting, contagion may be good and no policy intervention whatsoever is needed, because it helps 
promote peer monitoring among banks and achieves market discipline.  They study a system in which 
ex-post lending may be allowed to mitigate systemic risk, while still preserving the benefits of ex-ante 
monitoring.  If no monitoring is allowed, then bank managers have an incentive to act opportunistically 
and undertake activities that may not necessarily be in the interest of other stakeholders. To prevent this 
behaviour which leads to moral hazard, some form of monitoring technology is used.   
 
In the Rochet and Tirole (1996) model, banks face heterogenous liquidity shocks. Those that cannot 
raise liquidity are forced to stop their projects and go bankrupt. To prevent this, banks with excess 
liquidity can lend to banks facing liquidity shortage and monitor the borrowing banks, provided the 
costs of so-doing, are not too high. Under incentive-compatible interbank lending, the performance of 
the lending bank must be dependent on the performance of the borrowing bank, but not vice versa. 
Only under this condition, will the lending bank have an incentive to monitor the borrowing bank.  This 
suggests that, sometimes, it may be good to close down a solvent bank with exposures to illiquid bank.  
It may be good to allow contagious effects resulting from bank failures to spur optimal monitoring. An 
optimal public policy will present a trade off between the benefits of allowing contagious effects ( e.g 
greater monitoring and market discipline) against the costs of so-doing.  
 
3.3 Models with Informational Spillovers 
 
Models with informational spillovers mainly focus on the spread of a crisis from one bank to another, 
in a setup in which the banks’ fundamentals are believed to be correlated. There is no direct link 
connecting the banks, in the form of contractual arrangements such as interbank market in deposits and 
loans. Nonetheless, the underlying fundamentals are perceived to be correlated, in a way that invites 
correlation in payoffs of depositors of both banks. Hence events at one bank provide information to 
depositors of other banks  and the failure of one bank leads depositors of the other bank to adjust their 
expectations in such a way that their bank suffers from the same fate as the first bank.  
 
Chen (1999) studies a multiple bank setup  in which  the existence of demand deposit contracts coupled 
with informational spillovers, leads to some form of strategic complementarity and hence create 
conditions for contagious banking crises. Banks basically invest in risky assets, with the returns to risky 
asset, being positively correlated across banks. In each bank, a fraction of patient depositors observe 
the return to the risky asset perfectly. In addition, these depositors do not observe their signals at the 
same time: depositors of a subset of banks move first (i.e take their decision first) and then, depositors 
in the remaining banks act. Depositors in the latter group are assumed to noisily observe the number of 
bank failures in the first group of banks. They may run on their own banks, even before observing their 
signals about their own banks’ project realisations.  
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 Chen (1999) goes on to show that, given demand deposit contracts, there exists a critical threshold in 
the number of failures among the first mover bank. If the actual number  exceeds the critical threshold, 
then all depositors in the remaining banks will run on their banks. The specific features of the contract 
are also analysed. The optimal deposit contract is influenced by any possibility of bank panic. Bank 
panics become more likely,  the higher the prior probability about the state of the economy being bad 
and the higher the period 1 (i.e interim period) deposit payment. 
 
3.3.1 Robustness of Informational Spillover Models and Policy Implications 
Chen’s model highlights an important attribute of  models involving contagion from informational 
spillover effects: that information transparency is important in mitigating the spread of crises. The same 
can be said about Dasgupta (2002). By increasing the precision of signals and coordinating beliefs on 
the proper outcome, the ‘contagion spread’ can be minimised, thereby mitigating the onset of a crisis 
spread.  Archarya and Yorulmazer (2003) reach a similar conclusion. They extend the informational 
spillover approach by constructing a model of systemic risk involving banks, with informational 
contagion existing on banks’ liabilities side, and bank loan correlations existing on the asset side. The 
interaction between the two enables them study the ex-post and ex-ante aspects of systemic risk.  In 
their model, the return to bank loans has two components: a systematic component and an idiosyncratic 
component. Depositors can observe the overall realisation of bank loan returns, but not the actual 
decomposition. So, when one bank fails, depositors of the other bank think that signals send bad news 
about the overall performance of the economy, and use Bayes rule to update their priors. The rate of 
return on deposits (or borrowing) to staying in the second bank, is adjusted in such a way that it shares 
a similar fate to the first bank. To mitigate this informational spillover resulting from one bank’s events 
on another bank’s borrowing costs, both banks engage in ex-ante herding ( i.e endogenously choose 
correlated portfolios) in order to maximise the possibility of joint survival. The model has policy 
implications that share similar tenets to those of Chen (1999): as long as a policy instrument succeeds 
to make the interest rate on deposits (or borrowing) insensitive to bank events, no informational 
spillover occurs and the ex-post cost of mitigating contagion will be minimised. Informational 
transparency would, for example, make the distinction clear between the systematic and the 
idiosyncratic component of bank loan returns. If depositors of the second bank know that the bad 
performance of the first bank has been due to idiosyncratic poor performance of loans of the first bank 
and not due to overall bad performance, then they will not be tempted to run on their own bank. Thus, 
no informational  spillover results. 
 
Other approaches in the literature consider the interaction between informational spillover effects and 
aggregate liquidity position: Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) show how, in the presence of 
imperfect information about banks’ liquidity15,  a liquidity problem at one solvent individual bank 
                                                 
15 Chen (1999) considered the case when there was imperfect information on banks’ solvency. 
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level, may have widespread contagious effects. If banks are subject to uncertainty in the timing of 
realisations of their long asset returns, a liquidity shock could lead to a high proportion of cash-
strapped banks (banks that are faced with the prospects of delayed returns and high short term deposit 
withdrawals) relative to cash-abundant banks (banks that are faced with the prospects of immediate 
returns realisations and low short term deposit withdrawals). If the cash-abundant banks can service the 
cash-strapped banks through  the interbank market, there is no need for public policy intervention. 
Should the amount required be beyond the reach of cash-abundant banks altogether, then there will be 
aggregate liquidity shortage, with some cash-strapped banks being rationed (the interbank lending rate 
is fixed)  whereas others are forced to liquidate their long assets. By observing other bank failures, 
depositors think that this may be due to  aggregate liquidity shortage. Fearing the worse about their 
own bank, they withdraw. The inability of the interbank market to function effectively means that the 
desire for public policy intervention is called for. In a similar spirit of thought, Diamond and Rajan 
(2001b) consider how, through an interplay between illiquidity and insolvency, an aggregate liquidity 
shortage leads to contagion. Their paper is closely related to Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000), 
but stresses that banks facing liquidity problems usually try to issue new deposits to bridge the liquidity 
gap. To do so, they must raise interest on deposits. This reduces the value of bank assets and leads to 
insolvencies.  
 
Policy implications have similar traits to those of informational spillover models of Chen (1999) and 
Archarya and Yorulmazer (2003). Increased transparency will enable depositors make difference 
between aggregate liquidity stance and their own bank’s liquidity position. As a result, they will be 
able to make more reasonable judgements about their own bank’s position. Injection of liquidity into 
the system can be carried out, but there are questions that will inevitably prop up as to whether the 
liquidity injection should be applicable to cash-strapped banks only. Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont 
(2000) investigate the costs and benefits of having an unregulated banking system. While the absence 
of public safety nets provides incentives for peer monitoring and eliminates moral hazard among banks, 
it also fails to block the channel through which aggregate liquidity shocks are channelled throughout 
the banking system. This brings questions about what the optimal public safety net should be.  
 
How about standard central bank policy measures ? An interesting contradiction with the models of 
contagion based on direct links as above, is that here, the expectations of depositors are explicitly 
modelled. Thus, the effectiveness of policy measures administered at the bank experiencing the initial 
shock, will depend crucially on how depositors react to these policy measures. Generally, such 
measures applied to the initial bank, will create an externality (positive or negative) on other banks. As 
such, policy measures, by themselves, may create a distortion between privately optimal and socially 
optimal outcomes and beg in questions as to whether these measures should not be more ‘general’ ( i.e 
applied  to those banks that are considered to be most vulnerable to informational spillover effects, 
rather than to banks that experience the liquidity shock in the first instance). 
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3.4 Models with Asset Price Changes  
Amongst others, Schnabel and Shin (2003), find evidence of high asset price correlation for different 
assets in Europe, during times of financial distress. The obvious explanation is aggregate liquidity 
shortage. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2003) show that, with a pattern of interconnectedness generated 
by a rich structure of cross-holdings, coupled with the existence of regulatory solvency constraints, the 
demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, so that asset sales to meet liquidity demands by 
institutions will largely depress asset prices. Many studies carried out find evidence for an asset price 
channel, as potential explanation of a spread of a crisis from one bank to another. The determination of 
asset prices, in equilibrium, will depend on the availability of liquidity in the system16. If banks have 
access to efficient markets for liquidity provision, then there will be no need to liquidate assets, and, 
asset prices will not be affected.  In the event in which illiquid banks are forced to liquidate their assets 
in order to meet demand for liquidity, the price of such assets may fall – thereby affecting the value of 
portfolios of all banks in the financial system. We shall refer more explicitly as to why the prices fall 
during liquidation and what corrective mechanisms may be taken to mitigate asset price changes in the 
next section. The main policy implications for this section are subsumed in table 5, as follows: 
 
              Table 5: Models  with  Multiple  Banks 
 Ex-ante policy measures Ex-post policy measures 
Interbank network connections 
(through balance sheet) 
Design of network structure 
connecting banks matters 
(only in incomplete network 
structure): Policy measures taken 
at bank experiencing the liquidity 
shock (same as one-bank setting): 
No need to take account of 
spillover effects that policy 
measures will present to other 
banks 
Informational Spillovers Increased transparency for more 
informed judgement 
Policy measures taken at bank 
experiencing the liquidity shock : 
there is a need to take account of 
spillover effects  that policy 
measures  will present to other 
banks 
 
 
                                                 
16 We shall refer more explicitly to the relationship between liquidity supply and asset prices in the next section, when we 
integrate models of financial intermediaries with models of financial markets. 
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  4.  Models of Financial Intermediaries and Financial Markets 
4.1 Introduction 
Banks facing illiquidity problems usually have recourse to financial markets or to the interbank market 
in order to alleviate their temporary illiquidity problems. It is the purpose of this section to consider 
what market failures may inhibit the smooth operation of the financial market or the interbank market, 
thereby preventing banks from getting access to much needed funding, and explore what policy 
measures may help restore the efficient operations of the markets. Denial of funding in times of trouble 
may lead to insolvencies, with system-wide implications.  
 
Till now, as far as ‘homogeneous banks’ are concerned, we have kept financial intermediaries and 
financial markets as separate from each other.  A bank can use financial markets in three main ways:  
 
• It can use financial markets as a way of insuring against aggregate risks – here, risks are taken 
to mean uncertainty about the distribution of early withdrawals or uncertainty about the 
realisation of investment returns in the long technology 
• It can use financial markets to trade the long asset. The illiquid asset may thus be liquidated 
in order to meet liquidity demands that cannot be met from the short asset alone; 
• It can use financial markets as a basis to issue claims against the long asset.  
 
Integrating financial intermediaries and financial markets in a micro based model has important 
implications for systemic risk and financial fragility. Gale (2004) argues that introducing these markets 
into models of financial intermediaries, has important implications for the welfare properties of the 
model: on one hand side, bankruptcy involves no inefficiency ex-post – firesale prices simply represent 
transfers rather than deadweight losses. On the other hand side, ex-ante risk sharing is optimal if there 
exists a complete set of Arrow securities for hedging against these aggregate risks.  
 
Banks, so far, have been assumed to liquidate their assets through some exogenous technology, with 
the price of the asset and the supply of liquidity, being taken as given.  This is a rather strong 
assumption. By trading their assets, the price at which the asset is traded, is not longer exogenous, but 
rather, set by equilibrium forces of demand and supply in the bond market. This provides important 
insights into analysis of asset price volatility and endogenous liquidity provision. In the presence of 
market failures such as incomplete markets for hedging against aggregate uncertainty or incomplete 
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trading opportunities, a bank’s interaction with the financial market, may lead to excess price volatility 
for the asset, in  such a way that this jeopardises the ability of the bank to meet liquidity demands and 
fulfil contractual obligations. This provides important insights into the phenomenon of financial 
fragility i.e a situation in which small shocks can have wide impact on the financial system. The 
weakest link in this interplay between banks and financial markets is often the crucial role of liquidity  
in the determination of asset prices. In the presence of incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty, 
financial intermediaries are forced to sell assets in order to obtain liquidity. But since holding liquidity 
involves an opportunity cost, the suppliers of liquidity can only recoup this cost by buying assets at 
resale prices in some states of the world – this private provision of liquidity by financial markets is 
always inadequate to ensure complete asset price stability – which therefore reflects failure of the 
market mechanism to allocate resources efficiently to the banking system and calls forth, the need for 
public policy intervention.  
 
‘Heterogenous banks’ may engage in the interbank market, through ex-post interbank lending or ex-
ante cross holding of deposits, as crisis prevention measure against liquidity shocks. The interbank 
market was covered in the previous section. However, we were then more concerned with the role of 
interbank market connections as representing possible externalities propagating a crisis from one bank 
to another. In this section, we shall not be concerned with how interbank market failures may spread a 
crisis across banks but rather, with what the different possible forms of  interbank market failures  are, 
and how to eliminate them.  Goodfried and King (1998) argue that if the interbank market is efficient, 
then any solvent but illiquid bank will always get the funding it needs at times of difficulty. In that 
case, there would be no need for the central bank to intervene and its activity will be limited to 
monetary stability only.  
In case of inefficiency though, a solvent bank facing temporary illiquidity problems may turn out to be 
insolvent if it does not receive adequate funding. Public policy interventions, such as lender-of-last-
resort, would be highly desirable. Even if government intervention is justified in the presence of market 
failures, there remains key questions about the desirability of such policies and the particular forms 
they may take.   
 
4.2   Asset Markets as Liquidity Providers – Homogenous Banks and Financial 
Markets 
Donaldson (1992) develops a model in which the monopoly power of some banks may lead to 
significant underprovision of liquidity. Banks facing temporary illiquidity problem, sell securities or 
claims on their long illiquid assets. There are two sides of the market: institutions that demand liquidity 
(i.e cash-strapped banks) and suppliers of liquidity to the banks (i.e reserve agents).  Banks issue these 
claims to reserve agents, with the price of these claims being determined by competition among reserve 
agents. When the demand for liquidity is low or no reserve agents enjoy market  power, then the 
securities will trade at normal or fair prices. Conversely, if the demand for liquidity is high or there is 
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some form of monopoly power among reserve agents, these securities will trade at prices below their 
fair value. If the reserve agents are interpreted as banks that have excess liquidity, then their monopoly 
power depends on: their proportion relative to the total number of banks and the distribution of excess 
liquidity is more favourably biased towards some banks only, so that the other cash rich banks have 
resources that are not enough to meet total liquidity demand in the economy.  
 
Suppose there is some exogenous productivity shock that affects a fraction of banks only: this shock 
causes the rate of return on illiquid assets to fall below the level promised to patient depositors, these 
depositors will start running on the bank. The latter will be forced to issue securities on its long asset in 
order to meet any excess demands for withdrawals. If the demand for liquidity is strong enough that it 
almost inevitably affects price of securities negatively, this makes it costly for all banks to obtain 
liquidity.  Thus, technology shocks affecting liquidity position of some banks only have implications 
for asset  prices of all banks, and, correspondingly may affect the  solvency of other banks as well.  
Thus, financial contagion arises.  
 
Allen and Gale (1998) extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup by considering complete 
illiquidity of the long asset technology and by making the return to the long technology stochastic, 
dependent on economic factors. By doing with the assumption of complete asset illiquidity, any form 
of panic-based bank runs, is eliminated. It also  implements the optimal risk-sharing allocation, which 
is achieved by making consumption in the interim period (i.e period 1) dependent on the stochastic 
return of the long technology. From that perspective, bank runs can be seen to play an equilibrating 
role: Since there will always be something left for patient depositors to consume in period 2, early 
withdrawals by some patient depositors positively affects the payoff to period 2 withdrawals and 
lowers the return to period 1 withdrawals. Even though bank runs occur with positive probability, they 
are only partial i.e they involve only a fraction of late depositors withdrawing early (unlike Diamond-
Dybvig (1983), which involves all late depositors withdrawing early). In the model, bank contracts 
together with the occurrence of bank runs, can be seen to provide the right contingencies,  that allow 
the first best allocation to occur. 
 
Allen and Gale (1998) then relax the assumption  of complete illiquidity of the long asset by allowing 
for incomplete trading opportunities: the bank is allowed to trade securities through the issue of claims 
on the bank’s long assets. This allows the endogenous determination of the long asset price and 
endogenous supply of liquidity to the bank. The deposit contract promises to pay a certain fixed 
amount to depositors wishing to withdraw early. If the amount provided does not suffice, the bank is 
forced to sell its long asset, so that those depositors who withdraw early, share the liquidation value of 
the bank. If the price at which the asset is trading in the financial market, is equal to its long term value, 
then, even with bank runs, the allocation is optimal. This price is, however, shown to be below its long 
term value, suggesting that the market underprovides liquidity when the bank is facing a run.  There is 
a resulting redistribution of resources from depositors to potential buyers of assets or speculators. 
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While still satisfying the objectives of liquidity provision to the bank (though underprovided), financial 
markets break the possible advantages associated with bank runs as possible equilibrating mechanism 
because the optimal risk-sharing allocation is not achieved.  On the other hand side, buyers of assets 
benefit greatly because they are able to buy the long asset for a price which is below the long term 
value. 
 
4.2.1 Robustness of Models with Financial Markets and Policy Implications 
 
For financial markets, one of the main points we focused on, was the fall in asset prices that results, 
following a desperate attempt by the bank to meet its contractual liquidity obligations. This asset price 
fall is intimately related to the supply of liquidity. In the case of incomplete markets, this supply may 
not be enough to ensure full asset price stability. In models involving monopoly power as principal 
source of market failure and liquidity underprovision, market structural features were also an important 
contributor.  What is needed is a mechanism to prevent the price from falling when banks attempt to 
sell assets. Public policy intervention, in the form of central bank finance, could prove helpful here. If 
the Central bank provides a repurchase agreement ( i.e one in which it buys the illiquid asset at its face 
price from the bank at the time the bank needs liquidity, and, sell it back to the bank at the same price 
later), could help. By preventing the asset price from falling, the central bank successfully achieves its 
twin goals of liquidity provision during times of financial distress and prevention of systemic risk.  
 
In some cases, liquidity provision is seriously impeded by coordination failure problems. For example, 
it may be costly for cash-abundant banks to provide funding to cash-strapped banks. There may be 
incentives for each cash-abundant bank to free ride in provision of liquidity whenever the amount of 
liquidity demanded is beyond the reach of each individual member but within the reach of a fraction of 
cash-abundant banks. In all cases, as remniscent of models of coordination failure, there are multiple 
equilibria – with a ‘good’ equilibrium depicting adequate liquidity provision and a ‘bad’ equilibrium, 
depicting inadequate liquidity provision.  This provides a clear case for a central bank to intervene so 
as to reorganise banks and coordinate beliefs on the right outcome. 
  
In Donaldson’s (1992) model, the monopoly power is higher the more concentrated the supply of 
liquidity is among a few banks only, and, within this category of cash-abundant banks, the more biased 
the distribution of liquidity is among a few banks. Banking regulation, in the form of a well articulated 
competition policy in the banking industry, may be helpful in eliminating this threat of monopoly 
abuse, although Donaldson (1992) does not make clear, what specific form this competition policy may 
take17.  In cases in which the amount desired falls beyond the means of any individual bank, 
intervention in the form of lender-of-last resort, may be desirable.  
                                                 
17 In many instances, the number of banks facing excess liquidity or liquidity shortages may be beyond the control of regulatory 
bodies. If banks are subject to uncertainty in timing of asset returns realisations, an aggregate liquidity shock to the system may 
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 Allen and Gale (2004) build on their previous studies (Allen and Gale (1998), (2000)) to provide 
sufficient conditions for ensuring efficiency in markets, through properties similar to those related to 
the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. In a setup with financial intermediaries and financial 
markets, what justifies policy intervention, is simply whether markets for aggregate risks are complete 
or not. Rationalising the case for financial intermediaries based on limited participation of agents in 
markets for contingent commodities, they point out that allocation is ‘incentive efficient’ if financial 
intermediaries issue complete contracts. In the case in which market for risk is complete but banks are 
restricted to using non-contingent deposit contracts, default introduces a degree of contingency that 
may be desirable from the point of view of optimal risk sharing. Far from being best avoided, financial 
crises are desirable in order to achieve ‘constrained efficiency’ , but this does not imply a market 
failure. This means that there is no justification for regulation by public authorities. In order for 
regulation to be justified, it is imperative that markets are incomplete. As in standard theories of 
government regulation, it is first necessary to identify a market failure in order to analyse intervention.  
The argument of Allen and Gale (2004) can be summarised in the following table: 
 
                                Table 6: Incentive Efficiency v/s Constrained Efficiency18
 
Complete Markets 
(No justification for Public 
Policy intervention + No 
market failure) 
Incomplete Markets 
(Justification for Public Policy 
intervention + Existence of 
market failure) 
Complete Contracts 
Incentive-Efficiency 
(First-Best Solution) 
Inefficiency 
Incomplete Contracts 
Constrained-Efficiency 
(Financial crises can be seen to 
provide the right contingencies 
that bring efficiency) 
Inefficiency 
 
This approach was used by Gale (2004), in considering the optimal bank capital structure. Bank capital 
usually serves two purposes:  it acts as a buffer against unexpected declines in bank asset values and it 
acts as a mechanism that discourages excess risk-taking behaviour from the part of bank managers. In 
the presence of deposit insurance, depositors have no incentive to monitor bank managers and the latter 
have an incentive to pursue a risk-reward strategy (‘gamble for resurrection’) in order to maximise the 
option value of the deposit insurance.  Bank capital is required in order to check this possibility of 
moral hazard. Whether deposit insurance is a sufficient condition for justifying regulation of bank 
capital or not, is highly debatable. Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) develop a model that allows 
for the effect of higher charter value and capital adequacy requirements on risk-taking incentives. 
                                                                                                                                            
result in too few or too many banks facing excess liquidity demands. This cannot be solved by the interbank market (see Aghion, 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) for more details) and cannot be met by issuing new deposits (see Diamond and Rajan (2001b) for 
more details) because of the impact of raising deposits (through increased interest rates) on bank  asset prices. 
18 Taken from Allen and Gale (2004), Econometrica, vol.72, No.4 (Jul 2004), pp 1025 
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Control of interest rates, together with capital adequacy requirements, are necessary to achieve a 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. These interest rate controls increase charter value and provide 
extra instrument for controlling risk taking. A Pareto improvement is possible even in the absence of 
deposit insurance.  
 
This requires that the need to justify bank capital regulation, must ultimately beg down to market 
failures. If banks can fully internalise the full costs and benefits of capital requirements, then the 
privately optimal level of capital will coincide with the socially optimal level – then, there would be no 
need for policy intervention. For there to be a role for public policy regulation of bank capital, it must 
be shown that the capital requirement level chosen at one bank level imposes welfare-relevant 
pecuniary externalities on other banks.   
 
In an Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets, capital structure is irrelevant and the standard 
Modigliani-Miller theorem result holds. The privately optimal level of capital coincides with the 
socially optimal level and there is no justification for regulation. Complete markets act as a perfect 
substitute for capital. In the case in which markets are no longer complete, capital structure becomes 
determinate but the privately optimal level of capital still coincides with the socially optimal level. So, 
the case for public regulation of capital is again absent. In order to make a case for regulation, 
heterogeneity must be introduced among financial institutions, for example, banks facing different 
regional liquidity shocks. Efficiency would require cross-sectional (interbank) risk sharing, in which 
banks basically cross-insure each other against regional liquidity shocks. In the absence of complete 
markets, this efficient cross insurance cannot be attained. Thus, there is a case for public policy 
intervention. 
 
Irwin, Saporta and Tanaka19 (2005) extend the Allen and Gale (2004) setup, by considering a model of 
the financial system with heterogeneous banks and investment fund, within which financial crises can 
arise endogenously. Banks are subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate risks only whereas investment 
funds are subject to aggregate risks only.  Banks and investment funds interact through financial 
markets but the authors assume that financial markets for trading assets are incomplete – which prevent 
the financial intermediaries from offering state-contingent contracts that can replicate complete markets 
outcome. In the paper, due to different risk appetite for investment fund customers and bank customers, 
investment funds can be seen as mechanisms that increase the welfare of banks by improving the risk-
opportunities for the banks’ customers. For high levels of risk aversion, banks face excessive risks but 
investment funds face too little risks. For low levels of risk aversion, the risk profiles are inversed 
across banks and investment funds. The consumption allocation does not match the (Pareto optimum) 
consumption allocation under a complete market – thereby leaving scope for welfare improving 
                                                 
19 Many readers may view it more appropriate to include this paper in the next section where we consider the case of 
heterogeneous banks. However, by not causing any prejudice to our main classification scheme and headings and in tandem with 
the original line of thought discussed in this section, we have judged it more appropriate to include it in this section.   
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policies. The focus of the paper is on optimal policies that can be used to achieve the Pareto optimum 
consumption profile and to mitigate financial instability. Lump sum taxes and transfers between 
financial intermediaries can replicate the complete markets outcome for reasonable degrees of risk 
aversion, if they are contingent on the aggregate liquidity.  Liquidity requirements, however, cannot 
achieve Pareto-efficient consumption allocation20. The intuition is steadfast: under reasonable ranges 
for risk aversion coefficient, banks face excess consumption risks whereas investment funds face too 
little risks. Increasing banks’ holdings of liquid assets will reduce price  volatility and expose bank 
customers to lower consumption risk, at the expense of decreasing expected utility of investment funds 
customers that would prefer more rather than less consumption risk. Thus, liquidity requirements 
cannot achieve the first-best outcome.  The paper goes on to show how, regulation of one institution’s 
liquidity position  can lead to an inferior welfare outcome whereas regulation of both institutions’ 
liquidity position  can lead to a higher population-weighted utility. 
 
Pagratis (2005) considers the interaction between liquidity requirements and LOLR, in a setup in which 
the central bank performs both, the LOLR activity as well as designing appropriate regulatory policy. 
Prudential liquidity regulation is considered to be a quid pro quo for emergency lending assistance by 
the central bank where prudential liquidity is considered to be an implicit insurance to banks in return 
for LOLR insurance.  In the presence of funding constraints and possibility of information-based bank 
runs, the conditions under which liquidity requirements would be socially desirable, are examined. It 
follows that liquidity requirements serve as first line of defence against banks’ liquidity problems that 
allow the central bank to maintain zero expected cost of LOLR intervention, while counteracting 
excessive risk-taking. Thus, the more debt-constrained the banking sector is, the higher profit 
opportunities are and the less stable the deposit base is, the more prudential liquidity regulation is 
regarded as socially desirable.  
 
4.3 Asset  Markets with Heterogeneous Banks  - The Role of the Interbank Market 
 
So far, we have been focusing our analysis, in this section, at the case in which one bank dealt with a 
financial market21 and, how, that interaction may lead to financial fragility. The essence of the analysis 
would stay if we focused on homogeneous banks. In the presence of heterogeneous banks though, 
provision must be made to allow for the presence of the interbank market as a means of liquidity 
provision and liquidity shock insurance. As shown in the previous section, one possible way of 
interpreting the heterogeneity of banks, would be to allow for the presence of regional shocks that are 
negatively correlated across banks.  
                                                 
20 This is in contrast to Allen and Gale (2004), where liquidity requirements can achieve the Pareto-efficient allocation under 
complete market. The point is that in Allen and Gale (2004), agents are ex-ante homogenous whereas in Saporta et al (2005), 
agents are ex-ante heterogenous.  
21 In the special case of Donaldson (1992), we sometimes referred to providers of liquidity in financial markets as “cash-
abundant” banks. This is without loss of generality. The crucial point is that, since banks have been assumed to be homogeneous, 
it does not really make a difference as to what specific form this financial market may take. 
 31
  
The focus of this subsection, will be on the market imperfections that may impinge on the ability of the 
interbank market  to channel resources efficiently among banks. If there is no aggregate uncertainty 
and no market imperfections plaguing the interbank market, there is nothing that prevents an efficient 
allocation, as Goodfried and King (1998) argued. Should any of these imperfections arise, the interbank 
market no longer provides perfect insurance and an illiquidity problem may turn into insolvency, with 
system-wide implications. 
 
One source of market imperfection is informational asymmetry – banks in the interbank market may 
not lend to cash-strapped banks if they do not perfectly observe the composition of the borrowing 
banks’ balance sheet or if the amount to be borrowed is too large compared to resources of the lending 
banks. This arises because this lack of observation makes it difficult to distinguish between a case of 
insolvency and a case of illiquidity. As a result, interbank market may be channelling loans to cash-
strapped banks, against the promise of the banks’ assets. But the banks may be willing to liquidate all 
bad loans (‘non performing’) from their portfolio, so as to keep the good (‘performing’) ones. The 
amount lent by the interbank market may not be sufficient to generate their value in the interbank 
market. 
 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) develop a model in which informational asymmetry exists among banks, 
as regards each bank’s asset composition and the size of liquidity shock that each bank faces.  They 
show that, in the presence of such market imperfections, each bank will have an incentive to free-ride 
on the holding of liquid assets, since holding liquid assets is costly. The interbank market leads to 
underprovision of liquidity due to free-rider problems.  They allow for interbank lending, in the 
absence of aggregate risk. The existence of the interbank market, is to allow banks to borrow and lend 
to each other.  A banks’ liquidity and investment needs are private information, observable to the bank 
alone. In equilibrium, both type of banks hold the same amount of reserves – the only uncertainty is 
about the need for liquidity to meet early withdrawals. Either type of bank may not truthfully reveal its 
type in the interbank market. If interbank rate is lower than the rate of return on illiquid asset, the 
optimal deviation is for both types of banks to borrow from the interbank market. Since holding liquid 
assets is costly and, under model parameters, the return on interbank loan is lower than that of long 
term investment, there will be liquidity shortages at the aggregate level, even in the presence of the 
interbank market. Banks will free-ride on each other for liquidity and underinvest in liquid assets.  
 
Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) extend the Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) paper, by allowing for 
uncertainty in the timing of short asset payoffs. While the long asset pays off only in period 2, the short 
asset may pay off in period 1 or 2. Thus, with some positive probability, it may not pay off in period 1 
– in which case, banks holding it will face a liquidity shortage. The incentive-constrained second best 
solution requires  that the return on interbank lending is higher than the return on the long term asset. 
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Thus, banks that have excess liquidity, will always be compensated for giving away that excess 
liquidity to cash strapped banks, through high interest rates. As a result,  banks that have excess 
liquidity are profitable, despite the fact that holding liquid assets is costly. In equilibrium, banks may 
over or under-invest in the liquid asset. 
 
Alger (1999) allows a multiple-bank setting, with the presence of credit risks, as market imperfections, 
in the interbank market for lending. The model is very identical to the  Diamond-Dybvig (1983) 
framework, but with the added feature that the returns to the long technology is stochastic and the 
illiquid asset returns are correlated across banks. In addition, banks are subject to a probability of being 
solvent or insolvent, with this possibility of insolvency being independent of the liquidity shock 
realisation. The properties of interbank lending are analysed when banks have first best level of 
reserves, in the presence of credit risks.  Following the realisation of liquidity and solvency shocks, 
there will be two types of banks: liquid and illiquid banks. A liquid bank that is insolvent will always 
lend to an illiquid bank, in a desperate attempt to maximise the option value associated with its assets. 
A solvent and liquid bank will only lend if credit risk is low and the probability that it gets paid back, is 
high. Thus, in the presence of a market imperfection in the form of a credit risk, the interbank market 
may fail to allocate resources efficiently to cash-strapped banks. 
 
4.3.1 Robustness of Models involving Interbank Market and Policy Implications 
 
In this section, we have focused on the inability of  the interbank market to provide funding efficiently 
due to the existence of financial frictions or market imperfections. The inefficiency that result may be 
strong enough to force otherwise solvent but illiquid banks into insolvency, with system-wide 
consequences. The type of contracts that exist in each model are pre-specified: in Bhattacharya and 
Gale (1987), banks write contracts beforehand i.e prior to observing the liquidity shock. In models of 
Alger (1999), banks write the contracts after the realisation of the liquidity shock and turn to the 
lending markets only ex-post. 
 
In the interbank market for lending, the first best solution is reached when the optimal level of liquid 
reserves can be achieved. If this requirement can be attained ex-ante, then any form of trading in the 
interbank market can maintain it ex-post. In the case of non enforcement of this optimal level of liquid 
reserves, the second best is reached. In that case, some form of noisy monitoring, would constitute 
some form of Pareto improvement. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) thus offer a rationale for official 
monitoring of liquid asset holdings by banks, suggesting that liquidity shortages may arise as a result of 
banks’ incentives to free ride on interbank liquidity, rather than holding liquid assets themselves. In the 
presence of credit risks in the interbank market for liquidity provision, the first best level of liquid 
reserves, no longer guarantees efficiency. As seen in Alger (1999), banks may be unwilling to lend if 
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credit risks are deemed to be too high. Possible policy solutions include introducing mechanisms that 
allow trade to take place in the interbank market, for example, through central bank credit lines. 
 
The case for LOLR should also be put into perspective. As mentioned in section 3.2.1, LOLR serves 
two purposes: prevention of spread of illiquidity problem across banks and prevention of illiquidity 
problem from turning into a bankruptcy one.  While we were overwhelmingly concerned with the 
former use of LOLR in section 3.2.1, we shall be concerned with the latter use in this section. 
Regarding the role of LOLR in dealing with banking crises, Goodfried and King (1988) argue that 
solvent banks could perfectly insure against the possibility of bank runs via a sophisticated interbank 
market, suggesting that central banks should focus on maintaining a sufficient amount of liquidity in 
the system, rather than providing the LOLR facility. However, as we have seen, various forms of 
market imperfections  prevent the interbank market from operating efficiently and may turn an 
illiquidity problem into an insolvency one.  
 
Donaldson’s (1992) argument that cash-abundant banks may abuse of their monopoly power and 
charge above competitive rates, suggest that there is a clear cut case for LOLR. Goodhart and Huang 
(2004) argue that, if the amount of funding needed is beyond the reach of the interbank market or if the 
interbank market is plagued by coordination failure, it will be unable to provide liquidity to cash 
strapped banks.  They also argue that the interbank market may not be abloe to provide insurance 
against liquidity shocks if these shocks happen to be systemic, affecting the whole banking system.  
 
Rochet and Vives (2002) argue that, under certain circumstances, LOLR may be welfare improving. It 
prevents inefficient liquidation of a bank’s assets and improve welfare if the central bank has perfect 
information about bank’s fundamentals (i.e can distinguish between a liquid and an illiquid bank). In 
most cases, imperfect information may mean that public authorities will be confronted with a situation 
in which they do not observe the solvency of banks they are trying to save through emergency funding. 
In these instances, they may face the dilemma open to all policymakers in the face of imperfect 
information: that of either providing funding to illiquid banks that are actually insolvent or that of 
refusing funding to illiquid banks that are actually solvent. In most instances, in the face of imperfect 
information, policymakers need to weight the benefits of providing funding (in terms of preventing 
illiquidity from turning into bankruptcy or preventing the spread of a crisis from bank to bank) against 
the costs of so-doing (in terms of bailing out insolvent banks, moral hazard costs and absence of peer 
monitoring), and come up with an optimal plan. Ostensibly, this may mean that the optimal plan varies 
from case to case.   
 
Repullo (2003) also provides conditions under which a LOLR would be welfare improving, by 
discussing the effect of LOLR activity on holdings of liquid assets by banks. Due to high costs 
involved in holding liquid assets, LOLR may prompt banks to lower their holdings of liquid assets, 
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thereby leading to more efficient outcomes. Naqvi (2003) shows that, if the supervisory process is 
subject to noise, then the ex-post gains in efficiency, resulting from holding a lower stock of liquid 
assets, may be outweighed by the ex-ante inefficiencies induced by moral hazard, which is conducive 
to lower rates in the economy.   
 
SECTION C: OTHER RELATED ISSUES  
 
5.   Macroeconomic Issues 
5.1    Financial Accelerator 
    
Financial Accelerator models deal with the relationship that exists between a financial system and the 
real economy. Unlike models we have seen so far in this paper, most models under the realm of 
financial accelerator, abstract from financial intermediation (i.e do not subject the analytics of the 
Savings-Investment nexus as part of the model). Rather, the focus is on how, in the presence of 
frictions (in the form of informational asymmetries or limited commitment), financial systems 
propagate shocks to the real economy and amplify real business cycles. The result is excess volatility 
and larger swings in business cycles, relative to the situation that would prevail with no frictions. Most 
financial accelerator models focus on the health of debtors’ balance sheets or debtors’ net worth, as the 
main vehicle through which informational asymmetries  propagate a shock to the real economy. These 
financial accelerator models are taxonomised as thus: 
 
DEBT DEFLATION THEORY – The debt-deflation theory was advocated by Irving Fisher in 1930s 
in the wake of the Great Depression. It highlights the importance of (fixed) nominal debt as the main 
propagating mechanism of large and persistent swings in business cycles.   An unexpected deflation 
would cause an arbitrary redistribution of income from those who have borrowed money in fixed 
nominal terms to those who have lent money because the amount owed in real terms is higher. Debtors 
have higher marginal propensity to consume than creditors. Thus, the decrease in income that results 
for debtors exceeds the increase in income available to creditors. The decline in net worth of borrowers 
lead them to cut back on current spending and all future commitments, sending the economy down 
further. At an aggregate level, the economy is worse off with real output declining. 
 
BERNANKE AND GERTLER MODEL (1989, 1990) –  This model considers optimal financial 
contracts in the presence of moral hazard. There is information asymmetry in the form of agency costs 
that lenders have to pay in order to monitor borrowers accurately. Because it is costly to align the 
interests of lenders and borrowers, lenders demand a higher share of the returns from their investment 
projects, relative to the case when there is no informational asymmetry. Thus, external finance is costly 
relative to any form of internal finance. The higher internal finance, the lesser the extent to which 
external finance is needed and the lower is the external finance premium. This negative relationship 
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between internal finance and the external premium (cost of investment), creates some form of 
mechanism that amplifies business cycles when there is some initial shock. For instance, assume that 
there is a negative technological shock that reduces the current and future cash flows of firms22.  This 
induces a greater need for external financing while raising the firm’s external funds premium, and 
consequently, the costs of new investments. Reduction in investment will lower economic activity and 
future cash flows, amplifying and propagating through time, the effects of the initial technological 
shock. 
 
KIYOTAKI AND MOORE MODEL (1997) – In this model, financial assets act as collateral and 
also, as inputs used in the production process. This twinned role of financial assets determines the debt 
limit of borrowers (i.e net worth) and the interaction between these two roles, creates an implicit asset-
price channel. Lenders demand borrowers to post collateral in order to prevent them from defaulting 
strategically. The value of assets as collateral determines the maximum amount that borrowers can 
borrow. This debt limit will, in turn, determine the amount of investment that cash-constrained firms 
must undertake and, by correspondence, the demands for factors of production. Since assets also act as 
inputs, their prices will be affected. This affects debt capacity and the vicious circle process goes on.  
 
Illustration  : The vicious circle in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
Debt Capacity Limit
Asset Prices affected Demand for factor inputs 
(Asset) 
Demand for 
investment 
Value of 
Asset as 
Collateral 
 
There are three facts about financial accelerator models:  
 
• The nature of debtors’ balance sheet lies at the heart of the model. In the debt-deflation theory, 
fixed nominal debt determined borrowers’ net worth. In Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), it 
is the external finance premium. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), it is the value of collateral; 
• In all cases, the firm undertaking the investment project is cash-constrained. Thus, the need 
for external finance arises naturally given that internal finance alone would not suffice to fund 
investment projects; 
 
                                                 
22 Firms are assumed to be cash-constrained  i.e they need to rely on external finance for their investment projects. 
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• Business cycles have an asymmetric nature in that they tend to be more pronounced in 
downturns than in upturns. Crucially, the stronger the need to rely on external funds, the 
stronger the financial accelerator. During downturns, an increasing number of firms become 
cash-strapped because of the direct impact that downturns may have on their liquidity 
positions. The need for external finance is thus strong during economic slowdowns.   During 
upturns, the external premium decreases and the firm’s debt capacity increases as the firm’s 
balance sheet improves. Firms rely less on external funds in economic recoveries. The potency 
of the financial accelerator thus varies with the business cycle – being fundamentally strong 
during recessions and weak during recoveries / booms. Interestingly, this means that 
downward swings are larger and exhibit more persistence than upward swings. This 
asymmetric nature of swings retains a powerful implication for the appropriate shape and 
design of monetary policy. In those economies in which firms are cash-constrained, central 
bank needs to be more aggressive at relaxing monetary policy during downturns than at 
tightening monetary policy during upturns. 
 
5.2  Banking (Credit) Channel of Monetary Policy 
 
The previous section dealt with how asymmetric information and costly enforcement of contracts 
create agency problems in financial markets. As aforementioned, an external finance premium, which 
is a wedge between the costs of funds raised externally (by issuing debt or equity) and the opportunity 
cost of funds raised internally (by retaining earnings), has an important role in economic activities. The 
size of the external premium reflects the degree of imperfections in credit markets that drive a wedge 
between the expected return received by lenders and the costs faced by borrowers. 
 
It is important to note that, in addition to its effect on interest rates, monetary policy will also affect the 
external premium in a complementary fashion. Thus, the direct effect of monetary policy on interest 
rates, will be amplified by changes in the external premium. This supplementary effect helps explain 
the potency of monetary policy effects on real output. In particular, two mechanisms have been 
delineated as linkages between monetary policy and the external premium: the balance sheet channel 
and the bank lending channel. 
 
BALANCE SHEET CHANNEL -  This channel has its roots in the basic mechanism underpinning 
the Bernanke and Gertler model (1989, 1990) outlined earlier. A borrower’s net worth is inversely 
related to the external finance premium. Thus, monetary policy will affect the external premium, 
through its effects on borrowers’ net worth. Through this mechanism, the quality of debtors’ balance 
sheet will affect their terms of credit. As a result, their investment and spending decisions will be 
affected. 
 
Shifts in policy affect the financial health of borrowers in several ways. Tightening monetary policy by 
raising interest rates will directly reduce the net cash flows of borrowers and dent their investment 
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spending commitments. These  high interest rates are associated with declining asset prices, which may 
affect borrowers’ collateral value and hamper borrowers’ credit limits – with real effects on output if 
borrowers have to cut back on future investment projects. Lesser collateral also affects lenders since 
their ability to give loans will be restricted. There will be adverse selection problems in the lending 
market with the increase in market interest rates due to monetary policy tightening – in that, only poor 
quality borrowers will be willing to borrow at higher rates. Lower net worth and lesser collateral will 
also encourage moral hazard from borrowers because they will have a greater incentive to engage in 
risky investment projects. Since taking on riskier investments makes it more likely that lenders will not 
be paid back in probabilistic terms, a reduction in the firm’s net worth will lead to a decrease in lending 
and subsequently,  in investment spending.  
 
THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL – The bank lending channel works on the asset side of banks 
and begins with the premise that monetary policy shifts affect the external finance premium through 
shifts in the supply of bank loans. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) find that, in addition to the traditional 
effect on interest rates which works through bank deposits, the transmission of monetary policy works 
through bank loans as well. This view recognises the important role that banks play in channelling 
funds to small and dispersed borrowers who often lack access to alternative sources of finance from 
capital markets. This speciality of banks to small borrowers give them a comparative advantage in 
deriving economies of scope between their borrowing and lending businesses23.  If the supply of loans 
is disrupted, bank dependent borrowers may be shut off from credit. Thus, decreasing the supply of 
loans is likely to increase the external premium and reduce real economic activity. 
 
Several conditions must hold if there is to be a distinct bank lending channel: First, bank loans and any 
alternative source of funding (e.g bonds) must be imperfect substitutes among bank assets and for 
business capital. This assumption creates a distinct role for bank loans and suggests that they are 
qualitatively different from bonds; second, there exists cash-constrained borrowers who are too small 
to borrow in the capital markets and who thus rely extensively on bank loans  for finance; third, the 
central bank is assumed to be able to influence banks’ ability to lend through appropriate monetary 
policy; Fourth, there are imperfect price adjustments in order to allow monetary policy to have real 
effects on output. 
 
The credit view is important for several reasons: it highlights the fact that monetary policy can affect 
real output without much variation in market interest rates. Since there is a well-determined effect on 
banks’ assets side, it offers a fresh and innovative insight into how improvement in banking system can 
affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism. Furthermore, the 
credit channel can explain the distributional effects of monetary policy on lenders and borrowers, while 
the alternative sources of transmission mechanism (e.g exchange rate channel, asset price channel, 
interest rate channel etc) cannot.  
                                                 
23 The advantages may manifest in the form of lower costs of keeping reserves and   “relationship banking” that combining both 
activities can entail.  
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 In a nutshell, the credit channel highlights the view that bank loans are different from alternative 
sources of finance. Because of banks’ special ability to deal with small borrowers who lack alternative 
sources of funding, they can best cope with any problem of informational asymmetries that may be 
pertinent to small borrowers. Thus, any tightening of monetary policy that reduces the supply of bank 
loans will starve small borrowers of cash. Ultimately, investment projects will have to be postponed 
and real output cut back. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, we were concerned with identifying the key market failures responsible for creating and 
propagating a crisis across banks. Using a well defined taxonomy, we have analysed the resulting 
implications for policy mitigation. The proposed categorisation enables us to round up the main 
arguments as follows: 
 
• For models of financial contagion involving multiple banks and direct balance sheet links, the 
theoretical literature suggests that central bankers must pay attention to the network structure as 
ex-ante crisis prevention measure. If network structure is inappropriate and contagion occurs, 
then policy measures can be administered at the bank experiencing the initial liquidity shock. 
Because the contagious effect manifests itself purely from contact links or balance sheet links, 
these policy measures do not represent an externality to other banks in the setup. By preserving 
the balance sheet of the cash-strapped bank, they preserve the balance sheet of the whole 
system;  
 
• For models of financial contagion involving multiple banks and informational externalities, 
increased transparency seems to be the key ex-ante measure. Ex-post policy measures may work 
in pre-empting a crisis at the crisis-catalyst bank but they may have an externality on other 
banks; 
 
• For models where asset price changes act as major transmission channel or source of fragility,  
financial fragility may occur if the market for hedging against risks, is incomplete. Excess asset 
price fluctuations at a time when banks need liquidity the most, may result in an undersupply of  
liquidity to cash-strapped banks. In this case, repurchase agreements by the central bank can be 
helpful as a corrective mechanism designed to keep asset prices stable; 
 
• For models of financial fragility based on imperfect information in interbank market, the nature 
of liquidity underprovision depends crucially on the form of the market imperfection. Policy 
measures should commensurate with the particularities of these market imperfections; 
 
 39
The taxonomy we have adopted also enables us to put LOLR activity into perspective. As mentioned 
in the main text, LOLR may be carried out either to prevent  a crisis at one bank from taking 
systemic proportions or to prevent an illiquidity problem from turning into insolvency. The former 
argument assumes complete information and can be justified in our taxonomy in the scenario in 
which banks are contractually linked through the interbank market in deposits. The latter argument 
takes place in a setting in which there is asymmetric information and can be justified in our 
taxonomy, where the interbank market may undersupply liquidity to cash-strapped banks due to 
market imperfections. In some cases, a cost-benefit analysis must be carried out as the central bank 
may be lending to banks that are actually insolvent and illiquid while banks that are solvent but 
illiquid, may not get the much desired finance.  
 
We have also come across arguments in the paper showing that under certain circumstances, 
financial crises can be benign. They may be good because they discipline bank managers against 
acting opportunistically (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991); they provide a commitment device to  bankers 
to use their loan negotiation skills on behalf on depositors rather than using these skills for their own 
personal advantage (Diamond and Rajan, (2001); they  provide contingencies that allow the risk 
sharing  allocation to be achieved (Allen and Gale (1998, 2004);  (in case of multiple banks) they 
provide a mechanism that induces peer monitoring among banks in the interbank market (Rochet and 
Tirole (1996)). Theories that suggest that bank runs are good or efficient, do not make the case for  
public policy intervention sacrosanct.  After all, if the by-product of an efficient financial system is a 
financial fragility or crisis, any attempt to tackle the crisis will impinge on the ability of the financial 
system to operate efficiently. Any attempt to introduce policy measures to solve a financial crisis in 
this circumstance, may be welfare-reducing. 
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8 Appendix 
 
      Synopsis of Financial Crisis Initiators, Propagators and Policy Lessons 
     
 
Table 7:  Financial Crisis Sources 
Financial Crisis Initiators  Asymmetric information 
 Coordination failure problems in 
depositors’ game 
 Payoff externalities in depositors’ game 
 
Financial Crisis Propagators  Overlapping network of connections 
(interbank market in deposits and loans): 
network externalities 
 Informational Spillovers and Correlated 
fundamentals 
 Common exposure to fundamentals 
 Inefficiencies in Financial markets, due 
to incomplete markets and incomplete 
contracts, or market power or 
asymmetric information 
 Inefficiencies in Interbank market, due to 
market power, free-riding, limited 
commitment 
 
 
 
Table 8: Financial Crises Triggers 
Sunspots or ‘extraneous’ variables  Arbitrary shifts in expectations lead to 
coordination failure and to multiple 
equilibria (Diamond-Dybvig(1983)) 
Arrival of new information  New (noisy) information sometimes 
coordinates beliefs and lead to a unique 
outcome (Chari-Jangannathan (1988), 
Jacklin-Bhattacharya (1988), Goldstein 
and Pauzner (2000), Morris and Shin 
(1998, 2000)) 
 New information can lead to contagion, 
with interbank exposures (Dasgupta 
(2000)) 
Productivity Shocks  Exogenous shocks can lead to 
coordination failure, even in the absence 
of informational asymmetry (Diamond-
Rajan (2001)) 
 Exogenous shocks are a necessary 
condition for financial contagion to 
occur in models with direct interbank 
exposure (Allen-Gale(2000), Freixas, 
Parigi and Rochet (2000)0 
 Can trigger banking fragility and 
currency crises (Aghion, Baccheta, 
Banerjee (2000)) or financial accelerator 
(Bernanke-Gertler (1989, 1990), 
Kiyotaki-Moore (1997)) 
Financial Shocks  Financial asset price declines can 
precipitate financial fragility and trigger 
liquidity problems (Allen-Gale (1998)) 
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and contagion (Donaldson (1992)) 
 Can trigger banking fragility and 
financial accelerator (Bernanke-Gertler 
(1989, 1990), Kiyotaki-Moore (1997)) 
 
 
    Table 9:   Policy Implications 
Eliminate Coordination failure  The idea is to coordinate expectations on 
the right outcome: e.g Deposit insurance, 
Suspension-Of-Convertibility (SOC), 
promotion of transparency, Capital 
Requirements. 
Promoting efficiency of financial markets and of 
the interbank market 
 The idea is to remove market 
imperfections or any form of hinderances 
that prevent an efficient provision of 
liquidity: 
e.g Using central bank policy 
intervention, in the form of repurchase 
agreements, to prevent asset prices from 
falling 
Eliminate any risk of contagion  The idea is twofold: (1) appropriate use 
of policy instruments as crisis prevention 
and crisis management policies; (2) 
appropriate design of network structure 
to make system more resilient to shocks 
and mitigate the onset of contagion 
e.g With respect to (1), Lender-Of-Last-
Resort (LOLR), bailout guarantees, 
collateralised requirements for 
involvement payment systems 
restrictions of credit exposures; 
      With respect to (2), adopt a 
‘complete network’ as far as possible, to 
siphon off any possibilities of interbank 
loss exposures 
Reducing impact of the Financial Accelerator  Appropriate use of monetary and fiscal 
policies in a countercyclical way 
 (For open countries): Increase interest 
rates if proportion of foreign-currency 
denominated debt is high and if elasticity 
of output with respect to interest rate is 
low; else, reduce interest rates  
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